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Abstract: Previous research has shown that risk preferences are sensitive to the financial domain in
which they are framed. In the present paper, we explore whether the effect of negative priming on risk
taking is moderated by financial context. A total of 120 participants completed questionnaires, where
risky choices were framed in six different financial scenarios. Half of the participants were allocated
to a negative priming condition. Negative priming reduced risk-seeking behaviour compared to
a neutral condition. However, this effect was confined to non-experiential scenarios (i.e., gamble
to win, possibility to lose), and not to ‘real world’ financial products (e.g., pension provision).
The results call into question the generalisability of priming effects on different financial contexts.
Keywords: priming; context effects; financial risk; risk attitudes
1. Introduction
A consistent finding from behavioural sciences is that human preferences, rather than being stable
and inherent in individuals, are heavily influenced by contextual factors such as the available choice
options [1,2]. For example, the preference reversal phenomenon suggests that no stable pattern of
preference underlies even basic choices: There is some degree of inconsistency when participants make
trade-offs between lotteries with different probabilities and values [3]. Previous research has also
suggested that decisions can be conceptualised as the result of an integration of influences derived
from both the description (specified probability) and experience (pre-experimental beliefs about
event frequencies) of risks. Therefore, the construction of risk preferences is also influenced by the
accessibility of events in memory [4,5]. Preferences have also been shown to be driven by processes that
are independent from inferences (e.g., familiarity) [6], the latter being more frequently hypothesised as
the main factor underlying human preferences [7,8]. Indeed, phenomena such as ‘choice blindness’
suggest that people may not be even aware of the reasons informing their choices [9,10]. Thus,
it can be argued that context effects often prompt complex mental states in risk taking, which result in
choice patterns that can violate normative assumptions about stable and generalisable risk attitudes.
For instance, Vlaev and his colleagues examined whether risk preferences are stable for different
financial scenarios and found that not to be the case: Valence and complexity of the financial product
at hand influenced participants’ decision-making [2]. Importantly, people made consistent choices
within financial domains (e.g., positive scenarios such as salary and negative ones such as gamble to
lose), but not particularly so across them.
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Previous research has also investigated the influence of priming, which has been defined as recent
context-activating complex mental states [11], on risk preferences. For example, priming has been
shown to influence decision-making through changes in affective state or mood. The direction of the
influence of priming on risk preferences depends on the valence of the affective state that is primed.
For instance, it has been shown that priming negative affect associated with a target item can increase
its perceived risk whilst lowering its perceived benefits [12]; the opposite pattern has been observed for
positive affect [6,13,14]. Relatedly, other findings show that positive mood is associated with more risk
taking [15]: Participants in a positive mood tend to report higher subjective probabilities for positive
events and lower probabilities for negative events. These findings have been explained by the mood
congruency hypothesis, which posits that information retrieval is influenced by the current affective
state; thus, mood-congruent memories are more likely to be retrieved than mood-incongruent ones,
which in turn impacts people’s decision-making as memory is hypothesised to drive judgment and
decision-making [4].
However, it can be proposed that, overall, inconsistent findings have been observed in regard
to the relationship between valence priming and risk taking [16,17]. Some results have showed that
positive affect is associated with more risk seeking, whilst other studies have suggested that positive
mood can reduce risk seeking [16,18]. Investigations about the effects of negative priming on risk
taking are less numerous. Erb and colleagues exposed participants to lists of words in order to prime
risk attitudes [11]. During the priming task, one group of participants rated the frequency of occurrence
of some adjectives, which negatively depicted risk-seeking behaviour (e.g., as “thoughtless”) and
positively depicted risk-avoidant behaviour (e.g., as “responsible)—together with some distractor
adjectives (e.g., “colourful”). Participants in this condition, where risk taking was negatively primed,
displayed reduced risk-seeking behaviour.
One avenue that could be explored in order to explain some of the above inconsistencies is the
investigation of the domain in which a decision is elicited. For instance, Vlaev and colleagues showed
that risk preferences were influenced not only by the valence of a financial product under consideration,
but also by its complexity [2]. This finding suggests that people may adopt different decision strategies
as a function of context, potentially reflecting different levels of processing (e.g., intuition versus
reasoning) [19]. Thus, the impact of priming effects might differ depending on the financial context.
For instance, it could be argued that contexts that attract shallower and intuition-driven processing
might be more vulnerable to priming effects, as they are less likely to be shielded by effortful and
analytical processing. On the other hand, it could also be argued that in complex decision-making
contexts, it is actually ‘hot’ (intuition-like) cognition that prevails, and more automatic strategies—more
vulnerable to priming effects—are implemented [20]. To summarise, it could be argued that people
may interpret the risk in a different manner depending on the domain in which it is framed.
In light of the above research, it is yet unknown whether affect priming and contextual domains
interact in determining financial risk taking. Relatedly, it is yet to be examined whether negative
priming impacts financial decision-making regardless of the product under consideration. Answering
these questions might contribute to the literature on financial risk taking in different ways. First,
if priming effects are moderated by financial context, sustaining the stability of risk preferences
becomes even more arduous. Second, the results will shed more light on the debate between ‘hot’
(intuition) and ‘cold’ (reasoning) cognition [20]—and on the interplay between processing depth and
risk preferences. Finally, a systematic investigation of the effects of priming on risky decision-making
in different financial scenarios is still missing. None of the published studies addresses those issues
satisfactorily. For example, although Erb and colleagues examined the influence of priming on
different contexts of risky decision-making [11], these were confined mainly to non-financial scenarios
(e.g., holiday travel, betting on horses and buying a car). Moreover, Moore and Chater showed that
for gambles to win, positive mood is associated with higher risk-seeking behaviour (Experiment 1);
however, their investigation examined only one financial context [21]. The same limitation applies
to a more recent study on priming, which included only investments as the financial domain under
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scrutiny [22]. Finally, the research by Isen and colleagues mostly involved the analysis of hypothetical
gambles to win or to lose, and thus did not systematically examine the effects of priming on different
financial products [17].
The Present Experiment
Participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire, which either had no background (neutral
condition) or was printed on a picture of a dark tornado (negative priming condition). We used
negative priming only as (a) the effects of negative priming are generally less explored in the study of
financial risk taking and (b) negative events usually evoke greater immediate response than positive
ones—for a review, see [23].
As a measure of risk seeking, we used a self-report and a variance-based hypothetical measure
(see Appendix A). In this test, participants had to choose between five different options [24].
Each option had two potential outcomes, both equally likely to happen. The five options differed only
according to the difference between the two amounts in each outcome. The two amounts in the first
option (Option 1) always had a difference of zero; this difference increased linearly from Options 2 to 5,
where the difference between the two potential outcomes was the largest (see Section 4.3 for
further detail).
The hypothetical decision-making situations were framed as six different financial contexts. In this
respect, we would like to stress that we made sure that there were analogous real financial products on
the market. The frames we utilised were monetary gambles (i.e., gamble to win or to lose), insurance,
pension provision, investment, and job salary (see Appendix A).
It is important to notice that the same risky questions were asked within each of the six
different financial contexts; hence, the description of the problem was the only factor that could
affect participants’ risk preferences—apart from the priming condition. Thus, the present study used
a 2 (between: priming) × 6 (within: financial domain) mixed design. Finally, we controlled for absolute
wealth by offering similar amounts across the different financial scenarios (see Section 4 below for
further details regarding methodology).
2. Results
Irrespectively of financial context and priming condition, participants exhibited relatively low
levels of risk-seeking behaviour. Almost two out of three of all the choices (62.5%) were for Options 1
and 2—and only 10.4% for Option 5 (the riskiest option). Over a fourth of choices (27.1%) were for
Options 3 and 4.
The distributions of the six measures—i.e., risk-seeking preferences in each financial
context—were inspected. Large deviations from normality were noted; for example, Pension
(skewness, s = 1.1), Salary (s = 1.0) and Gamble to lose (s = 0.9) were positively skewed. Gamble to
win (kurtosis, k = −1.4) and Insurance (k = −1.2) were platykurtic (SE for skewness was equal to 0.2;
for kurtosis, it was 0.4). Considering that the normality assumption was not met and that participants
provided one rating only for each scenario, non-parametric statistical analyses were run. In any case,
the same results were obtained when the corresponding parametric analyses were run.
Overall, negative priming influenced the total amount of risk taken (see Figure 1 below);
participants in the negative priming condition (Mean rank = 51.5) took significantly less risk than
participants in the neutral condition (Mean rank = 69.5), U (N = 120) = 2342.0, z = 2.9, p = 0.004, r = 0.24.
Also, the financial context affected the amount of risk taken, regardless of priming, χ2 (5) = 49.2,
p < 0.001 (Friedman test). Regardless of the priming condition, Gamble to lose (Mean rank = 2.9)
attracted the safest choices, while Gamble to win (Mean rank = 4.2) attracted the riskiest
decision-making. In order to examine priming effects on risk taking depending on the financial
scenario, separate Mann-Whitney U tests were run on each of the six domains, and p-values were
adjusted according to the Bonferroni correction (the between-subjects factor was priming, negative
vs. neutral). Of the six scenarios, only two provided a significant main effect of priming and
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they were Gamble to lose (U (N = 120) = 2313.0, z = 2.9, p = 0.018, r = 0.27) and Gamble to win
(U (N = 120) = 2288.0, z = 2.6, p = 0.048, r = 0.24). The effect of priming in the remaining four domains
was not significant (all p-values > 0.35). In the Gamble to win and lose scenarios, negatively primed
participants (Mean rank = 52.4 and Mean rank = 51.9, respectively) took significantly less risk than
participants in the neutral condition (Mean rank = 68.6 and Mean rank = 69.1, respectively).
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Figure 1. Mean risk taken as a function of financial scenario and priming. Error bars represent 95% CI.
3. Discussion
In the present study, priming effects were observed, as participants exposed to negative priming
were less likely to take risky decisions (see also [25]). Interestingly, this negative priming effect
was confined to simple and non-experiential financial scenarios (i.e., gambling to win or to lose).
Compared to financial products such as pension provision or insurance, it can be argued that simple
monetary gambles may represent a different (possibly simplified) version of the choices people take
for real financial products. A potential explanation of the above difference could be as follows: People
may understand (conceptualise) the financial risk differently in each decision-making domain. It is
plausible that the respondents’ risky behaviour is informed by aspects of the interface with which
they are dealing, rather than underlying decision-making processes. Specifically, it could be argued
that people’s experiences of events “leak” into decisions even when risk information is explicitly
provided—an integration of experience and description of risks on preferences [5]. A consequence
of this view is that people do not have stable underlying preferences for risk; instead, context and
experience determine preferences even when the utilities (risk and reward) of alternative options are
known [4,5].
Already, previous results questioned the assumption that monetary gambles are a methodology
that accurately measures people’s risk preferences across financial domains [2,4,26]. Simpler situations
such as gambling scenarios might induce different decision-making processes than real financial
scenarios. The results of the present study suggest that people are more largely affected by
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situational factors (e.g., affective activation) when gambles to win or to lose are presented, rather than
financial products.
These results are somewhat in line with those of Gilad and Kliger [22]. In their study, professionals
(commercial bank investment advisors and accountants in Certified Public Accounting firms) were
more affected by priming; the authors argued that professionals may use more intuitive—and less
analytic—decision-making, which made them more vulnerable to priming biases. Here, we suggest
that less analytical strategies were employed for hypothetical monetary gambles (i.e., possibility to
lose, gamble to win), due to their non-experiential nature. When ‘real world’ financial domains were
under consideration, the cognitive system might have been engaged to a higher extent; consequently,
the higher level of processing hampered the effect of priming. It could be argued that when people
make decisions about gambles to win or gambles to lose, they just need to process the variance in the
payoffs—and somehow test their feelings of how lucky they feel at the moment. These are vulnerable to
priming effects, and the negative affect induced by the manipulation might have somehow influenced
the predictions on which region the pointer will be more likely to fall. On the other hand, when
participants approach say, an investment scenario, they may engage to a higher analytic extent—and
they may consider information not explicitly provided in the description (e.g., condition of the current
financial system, previous experience and/or knowledge of financial products etc.); this processing
in turn shifts the internal debate to an arena where ‘cold’ cognition may be called into play. Real
financial contexts may also induce people to retrieve more context-dependent information, and beliefs.
This “intrusion” of more complex memories and beliefs favours the use of analytic strategies as
compared to the shallower cognitive tools used when the situation at hand refers to hypothetical
gambles, which are more susceptible to priming effects.
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Participants
A total of 120 respondents (59 females) took part in the gamble test; participants’ age ranged
from 18 to 38 (M = 23.2, SD = 4.7). Participants were recruited from two UK based universities.
The respondents received course credits in exchange for their participation. Sixty participants were
randomly assigned to either priming condition. The allocation of females and males to either priming
condition was counterbalanced, as 31 females and 29 males were assigned to the negative priming
condition. All participants gave their informed consent for inclusion before they took part in the
study. The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and the protocol was
approved by the Ethics Committee of City University London (2013).
4.2. Design
Our study was designed as a survey (questionnaire); each participant had to make a choice for
each of the six financial products. In each context, participants had to choose between five different
options with binary outcomes. Each option was represented as a pie-chart, equally split into an
upper and lower area—these representing the equal chance of each of the two outcomes to happen.
The monetary amounts for the two outcomes of Option 1 were always the same. For Option 2, the
amount in the upper region was greater than the amount in the lower region, and this difference
increased linearly all the way to Option 5. Hence, Option 1 represented the certain option—participants
knew what the outcome was going to be. Option 5 represented the riskiest option, as the difference
between the two outcomes was the largest. The ratio between the upper and lower region amounts
was the same across scenarios, i.e., 1, 2, 4, 10 for Options 1 to 4, respectively. This was achieved
by increasing the upper region amounts by a constant amount (e.g., £680) from Option 1 to 5,
while decreasing the lower region amounts by half that amount (e.g., £340).
Hence, participants who were least risk seeking were expected to choose Option 1,
which represented a sure amount that chance could not alter. A more risk-seeking person was
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instead expected to choose one between Options 2 to 5—the last representing the riskiest option
within the choice set. Hence, the indicator of risk seeking behaviour was an ordinal measurement,
each determined by a single choice within each scenario. Note that the present measure refers mostly
to risk seeking behaviour, and no real measurement of risk aversion can be inferred.
As participants were handed questionnaires within booklets, four randomly pre-defined were
determined—so that each scenario was presented in four different order positions across participants.
The four orders were: (1) Win, Investment, Salary, Pension, Loss and Insurance; (2) Insurance, Loss,
Pension, Salary, Investment and Win; (3) Insurance, Pension, Salary, Loss, Win, and Investment;
and (4) Salary, Investment, Insurance, Win, Pension, and Loss. This strategy ensured that the influence
of sequential effects was minimised.
4.3. Materials
Priming was manipulated by changing the questionnaire background between the
two conditions [27]. In the neutral condition, no background picture was provided, as the questionnaire
was printed on regular white paper. In the negative priming condition, the questionnaire had a picture
of dark tornado as its background—for a similar priming procedure, see [28]. This picture was selected
from the International Affective Picture System database (IAPS), [29]—and was characterised by a low
valence rating (3.4, on a scale ranging from 1 to 9, 9 being the most positive) and high arousal (6.7 on a
scale from 1 to 9, 9 being the most arousing).
As previously mentioned, in each scenario participants were required to make a choice between
five different binary options, the two outcomes of each being equally likely; this measure was firstly
used by [24]. Risk preferences were measured as the choice made in each domain—the higher the
corresponding number of the chosen option, the more risk-seeking the choice. More specifically, level
of risk was represented as the variance of expected payoff (EV). Taking the gamble to win domain
as an example, the most risk-averse participants would sacrifice EV to avoid variance, choosing
Option 1. Intermediate risk preference levels were represented by Options 2, 3, and 4. Risk-neutral
or risk-seeking participants would choose Option 5—maximising EV in the domain of gambles to
win. Indeed, along with risk, also Expected Value (EV) increased linearly across the Options; that is,
choosing the riskiest option would have maximised EV for each trial. The only exception was gamble
to lose, where each amount represented disutility. For this reason, it can be put forward that this
paradigm did not allow us to test the predictions of Prospect Theory [30]. Specifically, the proposed
method does not aim to test the four-fold pattern of risk preferences (based on abstract monetary
gambles) predicted by Prospect Theory. Also note that, in absolute terms, the payoffs differed across
the domains; for instance, the highest payoff in the gamble to win domain was £4080, whilst it was
£4320 in the investment domain. Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, the ratio of the two different
payoffs for Options 1 to 4 was the same across the different scenarios.
4.4. Procedure
Participants received a booklet, which included the six financial scenarios—each with a specific
introduction and the options to choose from (see Appendix A). A general introduction explained that
the current study was run so to improve the presentation of financial information, and its aim was
to find out how people make risky decisions. It was also stressed that participants had to make a
choice as if they were taking that decision for real. Participants indicated their choice for each of the
six scenarios by circling the preferred option.
Author Contributions: S.A., P.K., and I.V. conceived and designed the experiments; P.K. performed the
experiments; S.A., P.K., and T.H. analysed the data; I.V. and T.H. contributed materials and analysis tools;
S.A. wrote the paper; P.K., T.H., and I.V. edited the paper.
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Appendix A. Questionnaires
Gamble to Win
In this decision task, you have to select one of five gambles. Each gamble has two possible
outcomes, each occurring with 50% probability. The five gambles are displayed below as pie charts.
The upper and lower region of each pie chart corresponds to a 50% chance of winning the amount
written in each region. Imagine that a spinner is attached to the centre of the pie chart. For example,
if the imaginary spinner is spun and the pointer lands in the upper region of gamble 1, the outcome
would be a win of £1360. If the pointer lands in the lower region, the outcome would also be a win of
£1360. Gamble 5 can bring you £4080 if the pointer lands in the upper region or £0 if the pointer lands
in the lower region. Imagine that if you have many chances to play one of these gambles, which one
you would play repeatedly. Please choose which gamble (1 to 5) you’d feel most comfortable to play
repeatedly and circle the corresponding number. Make this decision as you would do if you had to
take these gambles for real (see Figure A1).
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Figure A1. The five different binary options used in the gamble to win scenario.
Investment
Imagine that you are deciding which of five firms to invest in. You can earn an investment profit
with all firms, but with some firms your investment profit is more or less risky, which depends on how
successful each firm is. It is uncertain whether the success of each firm will be high or low because the
success depends on whether the economic and market conditions e been good or bad, r spectively.
There is a 50/50 chance that the outcome is good or bad for each firm. However, some firms are more
affected by the economic conditions than others. You have to indicate in which of the five firms you
would prefer to invest. The five firms are displayed below as pie charts. The upper and lower region
of each pie chart corresponds to a 50% chance of maki g the pr fit ritten in ch region. Imagine that
a spinner is attached to the centre of the pie chart. For example, if the imaginary spinner is spun and
the pointer lands in the upper region of firm 1, the outcome would be a profit of £1440 for you. If the
pointer lands in the lower region, the outcome would also be a profit of £1440. Investing in firm 5 can
bring you £4320 if the pointer lands in the upper region or £0 if the pointer lands in the lower region.
Please choose in which firm (1 to 5) you’d feel most comfortable investing and circle the corresponding
number. Make this decision as you would do if you had to play these gambles for real (see Figure A2).
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Figure A2. The five different binary options used in the investment scenario.
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Salary
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family and you are looking for a job at the
moment. In this decision task, you have to select one from among five identical jobs offered by different
companies which offer different monthly salaries. Each job is paid depending on the profit of its
company for each monthly period and can offer you two possible salaries, each occurring with 50%
probability (so the salaries are variable). The five salaries (jobs) are displayed below as pie charts.
The upper and lower region of each pie chart corresponds to a 50% chance of receiving the salary
written in each region. Imagine that a spinner is attached to the centre of the pie chart. For example,
if the imaginary spinner is spun and the pointer lands in the upper region of job 1 (the company
has a good profit), the outcome would be a salary of £1600. If the pointer lands in the lower region
(bad company profit), the outcome would also be a salary of £1600 (therefore, job 1 offers fixed salary).
Job 5 offers very variable salary and can bring you £4800 if the pointer lands in the upper region
(good company profit) or £0 if the pointer lands in the lower region (bad company profit). Please
choose which job (1 to 5) you’d feel most comfortable to start and circle the corresponding number.






























each pie chart corresponds  to a 50% chance of obtaining  the pension  (per month) written  in each 
region. Imagine that a spinner is attached to the centre of the pie chart. For example, if the imaginary 
spinner is spun and the pointer lands in the upper region of pension plan 1, which is all invested in 
bonds,  then  the outcome would be a monthly pension of £1680.  If  the pointer  lands  in  the  lower 
region,  then  the  outcome would  also  be  a monthly pension  of  £1680  (because  bonds  offer  fixed 
interest rate). Pension plan 5 is all invested in shares and can bring you £5040 per month if the pointer 
lands in the upper region or £0 if the pointer lands in the lower region. Please choose in which pension 
plan  (1  to  5)  you’d  feel  most  comfortable  to  invest  your  retirement  savings  and  circle  the 
corresponding  number. Make  this decision  as  you would do  if  you  had  to make  these pension 
investments for real (see Figure A4). 
Figure A3. The five different binary options used in the salary scenario.
Pension
Here you would have to imagine making choices between five different pension plans offering
different retirement incomes (pensions) depending on the proportion of your savings you invest in
bonds with fixed i t rest rate nd how much you w u d invest in company shar s, which can
be more unpredictable. Investing more in companies’ shares could bring you a higher pension but
there is also a chance of getting a low pension or even zero (losing all your savings), because the
performance of your investment in shares depends on the performance of the individual companies
and the economic conditions. In this decision task, you have to elect one from among five pension
plans each offering different possible pensions, based on the differing bond versus shares mixture of
your investment. Each pension investment plan has two possible outcomes, each occurring with 50%
probability. The five pension plans are displayed below as pie charts. The upper and lower region
of each pie chart corresponds to a 50% chance of obtaining the pension (p r month) written in each
region. Imagine that a spinner is attached to the centre of the pie chart. For example, if the imaginary
spinner is spun and the pointer lands in the upper region of pension plan 1, which is all invested
in bonds, then the outco e would be a monthly pension of £1680. If the pointer lands i the lower
region, the the ou com would also be a monthly pension of £1680 (because bonds offer fixed interest
rate). Pension plan 5 is all invested in shares and can bring you £5040 per month if the pointer lands in
the upper region or £0 if the pointer lands in the lower region. Please choose in which pension plan
(1 to 5) you’d feel most comfortable to invest your retirement savings and circle the corresponding
number. Make this decision as you would do if you had to make these pension investments for real
(see Figure A4).































house) or £0  if  the pointer  lands  in  the  lower region (in case your car  is damaged). Please choose 
which insurance (1 to 5) you’d feel most comfortable to play and circle the corresponding number 
(see Figure A6). 
Figure A4. The five different binary options used in the pension scenario.
Gamble to Lose
Imagine that you are confronted with a gambling situation, in which you can only lose money
rather than gain, or in the best possible case you ca break even by not losin . In this decision task, you
have to select one from among five gambles. The upper and lower region of each pie chart corresponds
to a 50% chance of losing the amount written in each region. Imagine that a spinner is attached to
the centre of the pie chart. For example, if the imaginary spinner is spun and the pointer lands in the
upper region of gamble 1, the outcome would be a oss of £1760. If the pointer lands in the lower
region, the outcome would also be a loss of £1760. Ga le 5 can make you lose either £5280 if the
pointer lands in the upper region or £0 if the pointer lands in the lower region. Please choose which
gamble (1 to 5) you’d feel most comfortable to play and circle the corresponding number. Make this
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Figure A5. The five different binary options used in the gamble to lose scenario.
Insurance
Imagine that you want to insure your new house and a brand new car. The insurance company
offers you to choose among five insu ance policies, which h ve the am price (how uch you pay for
the insurance). There is an equal chance something bad happen to your car or house so a claim on each
is equally likel . Some policies are moderately generous in d mage to the house and the car. Some
policies are more generous for the house, but less for the car. The five insurance products are displayed
below as pie charts. The u per and lower regions of each pi chart show the amounts y u get back in
case your house and car get damaged, respectively. Note that the statistics show that there is an equal
chance your house or car to get damaged. You can visualise these hazards by imagining that a spinner
is attached to the centre of the pie chart. For example, if the imaginary spinner is spun and the pointer
lands in the upper region of insurance 1, the outcome would be a pay of £1840 for your house. If the
pointer lands in the lower region, the outcome would be a pay of £1840 for your car. Insurance 5 will
pay you £5520 if the pointer lands in the upper region (in case you damage your house) or £0 if the
pointer lands in the lower region (in case your car is damaged). Please choose which insurance (1 to 5)
you’d feel most comfortable to play and circle the corresponding number (see Figure A6).
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Figure A6. The five different binary options used in the insurance scenario.
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